Economic theory indicates that E-retailers competing at price comparison sites, such as Shopper.com, must charge prices that cannot systematically predicted by their rivals. Consistent with theory, we find significant variation in the identity of the lowprice firm as well as the level of the lowest price for 36 of the best-selling consumer electronics products sold at Shopper.com between November 1999 and May 2001.
Introduction
The main stylized fact to emerge from the growing empirical literature on Eretailing is that price dispersion is both ubiquitous and persistent-even in markets for apparently homogeneous products (see, for example, Smith, 2000 or Baye, Morgan, and Scholten, 2002 , and the references contained therein).
The present paper shows that the price dispersion observed in online markets is consistent with we term "hit and run" pricing strategies by firms. The key testable implication of hit and run pricing strategies examined in this paper is that there should be considerable turnover in the identity of the firm offering the lowest price in the market over time.
Specifically, we show that hit and run pricing-short-term price promotions undertaken at unpredictable intervals-are an effective and widely used "weapon" for E-retail managers. This not only precludes rivals from being able to exploit predictable pricing strategies, but also enables firms to price discriminate over time, even when market forces preclude price discrimination at each point in time.
The theory suggesting the effectiveness of hit and run pricing strategies stems from an equilibrium analysis of "clearinghouse models" of price competition.
Clearinghouse markets are those where some or all consumers can gain access to a list of prices offered by competing firms for a similar product by consulting an "information clearinghouse," typically controlled by a "gatekeeper." Examples of such information clearinghouses are Internet price comparison sites, such as Shopper.com and Nextag.com. This class of models, which will be discussed in more detail in Section 2 of the paper, has led to important contributions and insights in both marketing and economics. The earliest clearinghouse formulation is due to Varian (1980) . While that model and its successors (see, for instance, Rosenthal (1980) , Narasimhan (1988) , and Raju, et al. (1990) ) were designed to explain price dispersion in offline markets, Baye and Morgan (2001) adapts the clearinghouse framework to capture some of the unique institutional features of online markets. Specifically, the Baye-Morgan model endogenizes a number of decisions including those of firms to list prices on the site, those of consumers to subscribe to the site, as well as the fees charged by the information gatekeeper to firms and consumers to use the site. Among other things, the Baye-Morgan model explains why price comparison sites are typically free to consumers but costly to firms.
In clearinghouse models, motivation for engaging in unpredictable price promotions stems from the heterogeneity between informed and uninformed consumers. Both the timing and intensity of sales is designed to prevent rivals from systematically undercutting a firm's price and thereby netting the mass of informed customers.
An empirical literature has also arisen to study the implications of this important class of models. In the context of offline markets, Villas-Boas (1995) and Lach (2002) have examined some implications of Varian's model and found limited support for it. Also in the context of offline markets, Rao, Arjunji, and Muthi (1995) provide empirical evidence consistent with unpredictable price promotion strategies in environments where the decision is a binomial choice to offer a regular price or an advertised special.
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In terms of empirically testing clearinghouse models in online markets, the extant literature is less well developed. Baye, Morgan, and Scholten (forthcoming a) test comparative static properties of various clearinghouse models using online price data while Baye, Morgan, and Scholten (forthcoming b) show that, even after controlling for observed and unobserved firm heterogeneities, 28% of price dispersion exhibited at a particular clearinghouse (Shopper.com) is left unexplained. The present paper advances this literature by explicitly examining whether a firm's position in the price distribution is persistent over time or, as predicted by the clearinghouse models, varies unpredictably over time.
Our study is based on data for 36 consumer electronics products tracked over a 19-month period at Shopper.com -a leading price comparison site. In the Shopper.com environment, consumers with Internet access can freely access lists of prices for physically identical products, but firms' are required to pay to transmit price information. These data exhibit considerable price dispersion, with the highest price for a consumer product nearly 60 percent higher than the best available price quoted by firms at the site.
1 Several studies discuss situations where promotions are not mixed strategies in equilibrium. Rao (1991) provides another rationale for price promotion: a firm with national brand recognition will promote -to enable private label firms to charge "regular" prices -as a defensive strategy for maintaining market share of non-price conscious consumers. Lal (1990) also shows that in a three-firm model, two firms that are "national" brands can collude to keep the "local" brand out of the market.
An open question is whether the central prediction of clearinghouse modelsprice unpredictability at the firm level-is borne out in pricing online. That is, do some firms persistently charge lower prices than others? We test this hypothesis and show-consistent with theory-that there is considerable turnover in firms' relative position in the distribution of prices. In particular, there is significant variation in the identity of the low-price firm and, to a lesser extent, the high-price firm for the same product over time. Thus, this paper offers some new evidence in favor of clearinghouse models as a potential explanation for the pricing behavior observed in some online markets. More importantly, it suggests that the strategy of unpredictable short-term price promotions is an important tool for managers in highly competitive E-retail markets.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: In Section 2, we outline the theory and intuition underlying clearinghouse models and summarizes the outstanding testable implications. Section 3 describes the dataset used in our analysis of this class of models. Section 4 presents our results, highlighting the evidence for unpredictability in online pricing strategies. Finally, Section 5 offers managerial implications stemming from the analysis in the paper.
Theory
As we have argued elsewhere (cf. Baye and Morgan, 2001 ; Baye, Morgan and Scholten, forthcoming a and b), price comparison sites such as Shopper.com are essentially "information clearinghouses" where firms transmit price information and consumers access this information in making choices among firms selling similar products. A key feature of this environment is that firm prices must simultaneously try to appeal to two types of consumers: "shoppers," who search intensively using the price listing service, and "loyals," who do not-perhaps because they lack access to the clearinghouse (as in Varian, 1980 and Morgan, 2001) or perhaps because they have strong "brand" preferences for a particular firm (as in Rosenthal, 1980 and Narasimhan, 1988) . The key point in all of these models is that some consumers observe the complete list of prices offered by firms and buy from the firm offering the lowest price.
Equilibrium pricing in all of these models entails temporal price dispersion. At each point in time, a (stationary) distribution of prices will be observed at the information clearinghouse; however the identity of the firm offering the lowest price will vary unpredictably over time. This is true under differing assumptions about the decision to list prices at the clearinghouse, the fee structure of the clearinghouse, the number of competing firms, perceived quality of service provided by competing firms, and so on. Intuitively, firms need to employ "hit and run" pricing strategies to preclude rivals from being able to systematically undercut a fixed price.
In arriving at these implications about equilibrium pricing, clearinghouse models share the following modeling environment: Suppose that there are n firms offering a product to consumers. Each firm must determine a price to charge for its product, and whether to list this price only at its website or to also list its price at a price comparison site (clearinghouse). Suppose there are L "loyal" consumers per firm and S "shoppers" interested in buying this product. Loyals buy from their preferred firm while shoppers buy from the firm offering the lowest listed price at the comparison site. Baye, Morgan and Scholten (forthcoming a) show that this general framework subsumes the models of Baye and Morgan (2001) , Varian (1980) , Rosenthal (1980) , and Narasimhan (1988) as special cases and formally shows (in Proposition 1) that the symmetric equilibrium in the general model also entails temporal price dispersion.
One might speculate that-faced a choice between the ruinous competition arising from attempting to price low enough to attract shoppers, or pricing "high" and earning sizeable profits from loyals-the optimal pricing strategy would be for firms to abandon shoppers altogether and simply charge a high price. Such a pricing strategy, or indeed any other "predictable" pricing strategy, is not optimal, as the following argument shows.
Suppose all firms charge a high price, say H. With all firms posting the same price, each firm profitably sells to all of its loyal consumers, and in addition, gets a share of the shoppers. However, since rivals' prices are "predictable," a firm could dramatically increase its profits by changing its pricing strategy. In particular, by reducing its price by an arbitrarily small amount, the firm's profits from sales to existing customers fall by a trivial amount. This loss is more than offset by the surge in demand from shoppers who switch from higher priced rivals to the new low-price firm. More generally, for any predictable constellation of prices in which rivals' enjoy positive margins, a firm can exploit the predictability by either lowering its price slightly below the best rivals' price, or abandoning shoppers all together and raising price to a high level.
In short, in the highly competitive E-retail marketplace, the pricing strategy that prevents systematic exploitation by rivals entails "hit and run" sales promotions, whereby level of price at any instant in time is unpredictable. An added advantage of this strategy is that it permits firms to price discriminate (over time) among shoppers and loyals; on average, loyals end up paying higher prices than shoppers, even though at any instant in time, the firm charges a single price in the market.
Several testable implications follow directly from clearinghouse models. First, the continued need to avoid price predictability implies that prices will remain dispersed over time rather than converging to some fixed level. Second, unpredictability in pricing also implies the absence of a persistent "low-price" firm in these markets.
Finally, the gains to hit and run sales obviously depend on their probability of succeeding in attracting shoppers. This success probability declines as the number of competing firms increases.
To summarize, three key implications of clearinghouse models are:
1. Persistent price dispersion: Firms' prices do not converge to the "law of one price" as E-retail markets mature.
Temporal price dispersion:
The identity of the firm offering the lowest price on the comparison site varies unpredictably over time.
3. Levels of price dispersion depend on market structure: Levels of price dispersion systematically vary with the number of competing firms.
Baye, Morgan, and Scholten (forthcoming a) test implications 1 and 3 using a different dataset of online prices at Shopper.com and find no evidence of price convergence over time and considerable evidence of a systematic relationship between levels of price dispersion and market structure.
2 While that dataset covered the period up to 31 March 2001, since that time price dispersion has slightly increased. Indeed, the site Nash-equilibrium.com, which contains current statistics on price dispersion in online markets, shows that for every measure of dispersion reported there, price dispersion at price comparison sites is at least as large at the end of 2003 as it was at the end of 2000.
Our focus in this paper is to examine implication 2-that there is no consistent low-priced firm in E-retail markets. In the sequel, we describe the data we used to examine this implication of the general clearinghouse model, our findings, and what this means for managerial decision making in the area on online pricing.
Data
To examine the turnover in the identity of low-price firms and, more generally, the temporal component of price dispersion predicted by the models discussed above, we assembled a dataset of 36 popular products at Shopper.com over the period November 1999 to May 2001. Shopper.com is a price comparison site that closely approximates the institutional structure assumed in clearinghouse models. Consumers using this site can obtain a list of prices for physically identical products and purchase the product from either their preferred or the low-price E-retailer. The products sampled include a variety of printers, PDAs, digital cameras, software titles, CDwriters, networking hardware, and other relatively expensive products.
A typical screenshot viewed by a consumer wishing to purchase a specific product (identified by a unique part number) returns, among other things, a list of sellers along with the price charged by each seller for the item. With a single mouse-click, a consumer can sort prices from lowest to highest and easily buy from the firm offering the lowest price.
Our analysis focuses on the distribution of list prices for the products in our sample; for a detailed description of all of the information provided-and for an analysis of the impact of the role of shipping costs, branding, trust, and cost heterogeneity in explaining price dispersion-see our companion paper (Baye, Morgan, and Scholten, forthcoming b).
Data collection began on 5 November 1999, when we began physically downloading screenshots for the 36 most popular products at Shopper.com. 4 Our sample was limited in scale owing to the labor intensive nature of downloading the screen shots and coding the resulting data. We chose the most popular products because these products were likely to remain in the sample for the duration of our study as well as being products where competition was keenest. This process continued on the 5 th of each month until May 2000. as the ratio of the standard deviation to the mean price of each product-averaged 12.5 percent over the period. On balance, the summary statistics in Table 1 reveal considerable price dispersion.
Data Analysis

Summary Statistics
Cross-Sectional Variation in Price Rankings
Next we turn to the question of systematic price differences at the firm level. Tables 2a-2d In the absence of temporal price dispersion and "hit and run" pricing, one would expect to see firms consistently offering prices within a given quartile, both crosssectionally and over time. The cross-sectional snapshot provided by Table 2a illustrates, however, the product offerings of most E-retailers do not fall into a single quartile group. Instead, there are only a few E-retailers, such as pcWonders, buy.com and eCost.com, who mostly offer lower prices than their rivals at the beginning of the sample. Similarly, there are some E-retailers, like Acentia and Micro X-press, who seem to specialize in offering high prices for products. Several retailers resemble
Computer411, offering some products in all four quartiles. dispersion are conducted at the product level and rely on time series variation rather than variation in the cross-section.
Time Series Variation in Price Rankings
According to implication 2 of the clearinghouse model, the identity of the firm offering the lowest (and highest) price should change (probabilistically) from period to period. Table 3a illustrates both month-to-month changes in the identity of and price offered by the low-price firm. This table records the price and identity of the low- The variability of low prices and identity of low-price firms is not a product specific phenomenon. Indeed, Table 3b shows similar variability in low prices and identity of the low-priced firms selling a Palm IIIx handheld organizer. In this case, 12 different firms offered low prices over a 19-month period. Consistent with the observation in Table 3a , there is once again non-systematic month-to-month price variability.
Clearinghouse models also predict variability in the identity of the high-price firm and high prices over time. Table 3c shows the price offered and identity of the high- (by about $8) over the period of our dataset, the high price declines by $138 over this same period. Thus, the range in prices is much less for this product at the end of the period covered by our dataset than at the beginning.
Formal tests of implication 2 using time series variation at the product level are reported in Table 4 . Following Swed and Eisenhart (1943) , this table performs a series of tests for randomness of groupings of the identity of the low-price firms, which is simply a non-parametric runs test. The null hypothesis-that the identity of the low price firm is random over time-follows from implication 2 of the general clearinghouse model. The alternative hypothesis is that some firms consistently charge low prices (perhaps due to cost or reputational advantages). 6 As the table illustrates, the evidence is broadly consistent with clearinghouse models-we can reject the null hypothesis in only 7 of 36 cases.
Similarly, Table 5 displays the results of runs tests for changes in the identity of the firm offering the highest price. Again, the null hypothesis is that the high-priced firm is equally likely to be above or below the median firm for each product in each period. Here, the prediction of the symmetric equilibrium of the clearinghouse model is not supported by the data-we can reject the null hypothesis at the 10% significance level for 19 of 36 cases. These results are less troubling for the theory if one admits the possibility of asymmetric equilibria. As Baye, et al. (1992) show in the context of the Varian model, there exist asymmetric equilibria that imply persistence in the identity of high priced firms, but not low priced firms. The data are broadly consistent with this.
Taken together, Tables 3a, 3b , and 4 show considerable variation in the identity of the low-price firm, and in low prices. In contrast, Tables 3c, 3d , and 5 show that there is more persistence in the identity of high-price firms. Thus, we find some support for clearinghouse models: While the identity of high-price firms is more persistent, it is less likely to observe a consistent low-price firm over time, or for a range of products.
Managerial Implications and Discussion
Managers operating in many online markets must simultaneously appeal to a variety of consumer segments. While some consumers are strongly motivated to use price comparison sites to buy at the lowest price, other consumers are more concerned with the reputation or marketing of an E-retailer. These consumers will buy from their preferred firm even when it does not offer the lowest price. A third consumer segment consists of consumers who wish to buy at the lowest price but are simply unaware of online technologies for finding the best price.
In such markets, a firm that persistently charges high prices in an attempt to extract surplus from loyal (or uninformed) customers effectively foregoes a profitable opportunity to capture demand from consumers motivated by price. Further, such a firm is at a competitive disadvantage relative to its rivals, who can exploit the predictability of its pricing strategy to their own advantage. The key is that, by undercutting a rival's price by a small amount, the small reduction in margins to brand existing consumers is more than offset by the increased volume stemming from the demand of price motivated consumers. Similarly, a firm which persistently offers low prices in an attempt to appeal to the price motivated segment of the market is also vulnerable to a rival strategically adapting its pricing strategy. The lesson for managers facing rivals employing predictable pricing strategies is to adapt one's own pricing scheme to take advantage of the defects in the rival's price management process.
Equilibrium analysis suggests that "hit and run" price management strategies offer an opportunity for managers to successfully appeal to all consumer segments without leaving themselves vulnerable to rivals' strategic responses. Effective revenue management in E-retailing requires that a firm be unpredictable in both the timing and intensity of its "sales" if it is to profitably compete for all segments of the consumer marketplace. Such a strategy also allows online retailers to price discriminate over time, thereby extracting greater surplus from all segments of the market.
The empirical evidence suggests at the fin de millennium, many firms at Shopper.com adopted hit and run pricing strategies. For the most part, we find little predictability in a firm's rank in the distribution of prices over time. Firms offering low current prices are no more likely than rivals to charge low prices in the future.
The exceptions noted in the analysis of the data prove the rule. By and large, firms that adopted predictable pricing strategies have been driven out of the market. In summary, the empirical evidence presented here suggests that hit and run pricing 
